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Thomson’s Violinist 
It’s the same, old story. You wake up one morning to find yourself 
back-to-back with an unconscious violinist who suffers from a 
fatal kidney illness. A glitch (a big glitch) in the hospital’s 
computer has brought it about that the violinist’s circulatory 
system has been plugged into yours, and your kidneys are now 
extracting poisons from his blood. As luck would have it, you 
alone have the right blood type to help in keeping him alive. To 
unplug you, now, would be to kill him. 
 But don’t worry. This will only be for nine months. By then he 
will have recovered from his illness, and he will be able to be 
detached without risk. 
 Thomson1 argues that it is not morally required that you agree 
to this situation. That is, it is morally permitted that, in the 
circumstances described, you bring about the death of the violinist 
by detaching him from your circulatory system. 
 One might resist Thomson’s conclusion as follows. All human 
beings have a right to life, and violinists are human beings. 
Granted: you have a right to decide what happens in and to your 
body. But a human being’s right to life outweighs your right to 
decide what happens in and to your body. Thus, you are not 
morally permitted to bring about the violinist’s death. 
 Thomson responds by proposing an intensification of your 
situation. Imagine that you would have to stay plugged into the 
violinist for the rest of your life. Surely, she insists, you are not 
then morally obliged to allow the violinist to remain attached to 
your body. And for the same reason, she holds, you are not morally 
obliged to allow him to remain attached for the next nine months. 
 But we can also consider what happens if we moderate the 
intensity of your predicament. Suppose that you wake up one 
morning and find attached to your stomach a tiny radio. The radio 
is transmitting to an unconscious violinist who has been found to 
have a rare and fatal kidney ailment in virtue of which his brain is 
no longer able to send signals to his kidneys. If you remove the 
radio, the violinist will die. But never mind, it is only for nine 
months. By then he will have recovered from his ailment, and the 
radio can safely be removed. 
 Are you morally obliged to agree to this situation? 
  
A Relatively Small Inconvenience 
I shall argue that you are. It is immoral to allow human beings to 
die when you can avoid their death at a minor inconvenience to 
yourself. My argument will be of quite general validity. Thus it 
will be not substantially affected if you are told that the radio will 
slowly grow larger and heavier during the next nine months, that it 
may cause vomiting, and so forth. 
 When we spend money on a dinner in a fancy restaurant 
instead of sending the money to feed starving children, are we 
behaving in a way that is ethically acceptable? When we detach a 
radio thereby bringing about the death of a sick violinist instead of 
undergoing a small inconvenience to ourselves for an interval of 
nine months, are we behaving in a way that is ethically acceptable? 
Even as we realize that suffering a small inconvenience is here the 
ethically better thing to do, still, the ordinary supposition is that 
there is in either case nothing wrong in our behavior. Even though 
we are not doing what is ethically better, we are still doing what is 
ethically acceptable. But as Singer and Unger have taught us,2 this 
common, comfortable thought can be questioned. What is most 
interesting about their work is that in order to motivate an 
uncomfortable ethical judgment concerning our ordinary ways of 
behaving they employ, along with undisputed empirical facts, only 
ethical theses that are already, at least implicitly, widely accepted 
 There are of course some who would be willing to suffer a 
small but increasing inconvenience for nine months in order to 
prevent the violinist from dying from his disease. As most of us 
agree, these people are morally better than the rest of us who are 
not willing to do so. 
 And the issue of what is morally better or worse is, certainly, of 
some intrinsic interest. When we are confronted with any particular 
case of what a person might do, however, it seems that it is more 
important to find out not what is morally better or worse, but what 
is right and what is wrong, what is morally permissible and what 
forbidden. And then we have to go beyond mere comparisons in 
order to arrive at a sound moral judgment. 
 What does it amount to, to judge our behavior in more decisive 
terms? Singer has argued that common-sense ethics yields the 
conclusion that, throughout most of our lives, we often behave 
wrongly. At first glance, this conclusion seems to have no chance 
of being correct. But the matter is rather complex. For one thing, 
our common-sense ethics may include certain rather demanding 
principles, even infinitely many of them, which we may rarely 
notice. Second, while there are many of us upon whom these 
principles will make almost no direct demands, they might require 
some of us in some situations to exert ourselves or to deprive 
ourselves to at least a small degree. 
 How do these principles apply to you? Let us assume that 
throughout your life you do everything that common-sense ethics 
requires. So, you will not ever harm anyone; you will keep all your 
promises; you will take good care of all your children; and so on. 
 Bearing this in mind, consider: 
 
Cheaply Decreasing Limb Loss. Other things 
being even nearly equal, if at nearly insignificant 
cost or inconvenience to yourself you can help 
prevent one or more other human beings from each 
losing at least one arm or leg, and if even so you 
will still be at least reasonably well off and 
unhindered in what you are otherwise doing, then it 
is wrong for you not to help prevent such others 
from suffering such loss of limb. 
 
This principle, given that it refers to just a tiny inconvenience on 
the part of the agent, is enormously appealing to the ethics of 
common sense. It is after all a special case of the more general 
principle to the effect that if, by doing x, you can prevent 
something very bad from happening without thereby sacrificing 
anything of comparable moral significance, then you ought to do x. 
Singer uses this principle to argue that we are obliged to help the 
poor:3 
 
If we can prevent something bad without sacrificing 
anything of comparable significance, we ought to 
do it. 
Absolute poverty is bad. 
There is some absolute poverty we can prevent 
without sacrificing anything of comparable moral 
significance. 
Therefore: We ought to prevent some absolute poverty. 
 
Arguments such as this can be supported not only by 
consequentialists but also by non-consequentialists. For the 
demand to prevent what is bad applies only when nothing 
comparably significant is at stake. Thus, an action which is in 
accordance with this demand cannot involve, for example, 
violations of individual rights or have other features of which non-
consequentialists disapprove. 
 There is an undertow of moral intuitionism à la Prichard 
here.4 That is, it is presupposed in the above that we can come to 
appreciate our obligations, not by hearing an argument, but by 
directly sensing the rightness of an action. If we make ourselves 
aware of the pattern of circumstances surrounding some action, the 
consequences, intentions and so forth, then at some point we will 
just see what we ought to do. Think, then, not of Cheaply 
Decreasing Limb Loss as an abstract principle, but rather of some 
given action that is in some given circumstances in accordance 
with the principle. This is an action that helps to prevent some 
other person from losing their limbs. 
 Now, in this actual world of ours, it is very unusual that you 
and I, and those of us who are not surgeons or physicians, get a 
chance to do much directly about human beings losing their limbs. 
With very little cost to ourselves, we seem to do quite well by 
Cheaply Decreasing Limb Loss. We can however help indirectly, 
by sending money to one or other of the many charities listed for 
example at: http://www.give.org/relief.cfm. 
 But where shall we stop? We can dodge the sorites problem 
here by noting that even to do a small amount of good is still to do 
something in the way of fulfilling one’s moral obligations, and this 
is so even if it is not antecedently clear where the point will have 
been reached – if there is such a point – where these obligations 
are discharged. (Perhaps, with virtue ethicists, we can simply 
counsel: moderation.) 
 Consider, in this light, the following maxim: 
 
Cheaply Decreasing Deaths. Other things being 
nearly equal, if at nearly insignificant cost or 
relatively small inconvenience to yourself you can 
help prevent one or more other human beings from 
each dying soon while substantially raising the 
chances that they will live healthily for years, and if 
even so you’ll still be at least reasonably well off 
and not greatly hindered in what you are otherwise 
doing, then it’s wrong for you not to help prevent 
such others from suffering such loss of life. 
 
As for Cheaply Decreasing Limb Loss, so also for this still more 
compelling principle, it does not favor greatly just those who 
happen to be close to you, the people you can see and have 
conversations with, the people you can touch and smile at. Perhaps 
that is one reason why Cheaply Decreasing Deaths is such a 
compelling moral maxim. But there are other reasons, too. First, 
this maxim does not only have that first expressive clause 
concerning the relatively small inconvenience to you; it also has a 
second clause concerning your continued good prospects. Thus it 
contains an explicit guarantee that even full compliance with it will 
never be extremely demanding. But further, and more importantly, 
we are here not just talking about innocents losing a limb or two; it 
is human beings losing their very lives. And as Singer argues, just 
as killing people is morally wrong, so also is letting people die 
wherever we could easily have done something to prevent it. 
Certainly, when we let starving people in remote continents die, 
then there is no identifiable victim. But the lack of an identifiable 
victim is surely of no moral significance – though it may play an 
important role in explaining why we do not offer help. Some have 
held that, while we are directly responsible for those we kill, such 
responsibility does not extend to the case where we simply do not 
help. Differences in certainty and intent are, to be sure, of moral 
significance, and they show that not helping the poor is not to be 
condemned as much as is murdering them. But it could be on a par 
with killing someone as a result of reckless driving. And that is 
serious enough. 
 But now there is a difference between our prior principle and 
the new principle of Cheaply Decreasing Deaths. For some of us, 
even those of us who are not physicians or surgeons, are here 
affected directly. Or at least this is so given one crucial assumption 
(call it ‘assumption T’), to the effect that the unborn foetus is a 
full-fledged human being. For then healthy, unwantedly pregnant 
women are almost always facing a chance to comply with, and a 
chance to fail to comply with, Cheaply Decreasing Deaths. 
 With both some sensible ethics and some empirical facts before 
us, we seem to be well along a common-sense route to harsh 
ethical judgment of common behavior. Let us keep going. Are you 
unwantedly pregnant? If so, today is one of the days in which you 
can act. Have you called an adoption agency, for example one of 
those listed athttp://www.adopt-usa.org? Perhaps. If not, then 
perhaps that is fine too. There is always tomorrow. 
 Our shared ethics includes infinitely many other principles. 
Another one is: 
 
Greatly Decreasing Deaths. If, other things being 
even nearly equal and at quite moderate 
inconvenience or cost to yourself, you can avoid 
killing other human beings soon while substantially 
raising the chances that they will live healthily for 
years, and if even so you’ll still be at least 
reasonably well off, then it’s wrong for you to act in 
such a way that others suffer a loss of life. 
 
Because it speaks of killing and of a cost to you that’s only quite 
moderate, the grip of this maxim is only slightly less firm than 
Cheaply Decreasing Deaths. It goes without saying that this 
principle, too, sanctions a harsh ethical judgment of common 
behavior. 
 One objection to the above which the non-consequentialist 
might put forth is the following. The principle underlying Greatly 
Decreasing Deaths is once again this: that if by doing x you can 
prevent something bad happening without thereby sacrificing 
anything of comparable moral significance then you ought to do x. 
Might it not be the case that the violation of the pregnant woman’s 
rights itself enjoys a moral significance comparable to the bad 
thing that is here to be prevented? One might put flesh on this 
objection by appeal to the concept of property rights: the mother’s 
body (including all its cavities) is her property. The idea that 
women have a right to their own bodies then contradicts the view 
that they are under an obligation to sustain pregnancy until the end 
of the term. However, as Singer argues, even one who fully accepts 
individual property rights must still accept that we are morally 
obliged to give money to the poor if this will save their lives. (Note 
that this does not however imply that governments are morally 
obliged, or even morally permitted, to extract such moneys against 
our will.) 
 And now similarly: even one who fully accepts the woman’s 
right to her body must accept that she is morally obliged to carry 
her child to term. (And once again: this does not imply that 
governments are morally obliged, or even morally permitted, to 
exact compliance with this obligation against the mother’s will.) 
 Thomson, famously, is held to have shown that even under 
assumption T – that foetuses are human beings – it might 
nonetheless be morally permissible to terminate the existence of a 
foetus. I submit that, if either of the principles Cheaply Decreasing 
Deaths and Greatly Decreasing Deaths is right, then Thomson’s 
argument fails. Every healthy pregnant women is, under 
assumption T, morally obliged to live out her pregnancy to the end 
of its term. 
 This conclusion is of course of limited significance as it stands 
(for I have not, here, offered arguments in support of assumption 
T). I believe that I have, though, shown this much: that if either of 
those principles is right, then you are in any event morally obliged 
not to bring about the death of the sick violinist by detaching him 
from your body. 
  
Modus Tollens 
But perhaps the Thomson thesis can be saved by appeal to the 
notion that unwantedly pregnant women who do not carry their 
pregnancy to term are behaving in a morally justified way after 
all—because they do not accept that the disutility involved in 
pregnancy is small. 
 There are, certainly, unwantedly pregnant women who 
have good grounds, connected with health or family 
circumstances, for holding that they face a major disutility in 
carrying their pregnancy to term. It is not these women who are 
add ressed in the above. Every pregnancy does, as we know, 
involve some risk to the health of the mother; but this risk is, in the 
case of healthy mothers, small, and it needs in any case to be 
balanced against the risks involved in the process of abortion itself. 
But to see why this residual risk, even taken together with all the 
other tribulations involved when a healthy woman carries her 
pregnancy to term, must amount only to what can properly be 
referred to as a ‘relatively small inconvenience’, we need to recall 
what is, under assumption T, the tertium comparationis: it is the 
death of another human being. 
 How severe an injury you may inflict in self-defense depends, 
as English shows, on the severity of the injury to be avoided.5 You 
may not kill somebody in order to avoid having your clothes torn. 
But you may do so in order to fend off an attack whose outcome 
would be a serious injury. You are, in other words, permitted to do 
harm x to a person P if and only if (1) P may do harm y to you if 
you do not do x, and (2) x is not a lot worse than y. 
 This, too, is a common-sense ethical principle which most of us 
find appealing and which seems not to encounter problems in 
application, in spite of its use of the vague term ‘a lot worse’. But 
it is a principle which, like everything else in the argument above, 
rests on an objective conception of utility. 
 Perhaps, then, the reader would have me turn my argument on 
its head. Thomson is right, some might say. You are permitted to 
bring about the death of the sick violinist, because utility is in the 
eye of the beholder. Even healthy, unwantedly pregnant women 
who do not carry their pregnancy to term are behaving in a morally 
justified way because, as their preferences reveal, they do not 
accept that the disutility involved in pregnancy is small. But then 
all of us can similarly insist, in relation to any given ethical maxim, 
that a great disutility would be involved in even token compliance. 
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